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Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)G).
Introduction

In 2008, this Court issued Conatser v. Johnson, in which it held that "the
public has the right to touch privately owned beds of state waters in ways
incidental to" their recreational activities on those waters. 2008 UT 48, ,-r 30, 194
P.3d 897. The Utah State Legislature responded to Conatser by enacting the Public
Waters Access Act (the" Act"), which is now codified at Utah Code sections 7329-101 through -208. That Act scales back the scope of access to streambeds over
which public waters flow, declaring that "[t]he public may use a public water for
recreational activity" only where the public water (1) "is a navigable water," (2)
"is on public property," or (3) is" on private property ... with the private
property owner's permission." Utah Code§ 73-29-201(1), (2).
The Utah Stream Access Coalition ("USAC"), frustrated by the Act's
restriction on access to privately owned streambeds, seeks judicial assistance in
gaining access to the waters its members wish to fish and float-specifically, a
one-mile stretch of the Weber River near Peoa, Utah. (Tr.Ex. 1; attached as Add.
A.) USAC has asked for a declaratory judgment that the one-mile stretch is
navigable, and because it is navigable, the State holds title to its streambed,
which makes the bed public property.
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But USAC has gone too far. It seeks a declaratory judgment that the State
has title to a streambed that the State does not want, and to which USAC claims
no legal interest. Moreover, the Act does not provide a mechanism whereby
members of the public may quiet title to property on behalf of the State. USAC
therefore lacks standing to challenge the existing landowners' title, and the
district court erred in declaring the State to hold title to the bed of this stretch of
the Weber River.
USAC otherwise claims that it is entitled to access the one-mile stretch of
the Weber River because the river is navigable. This claim is governed by the
Act, and it follows that the definition of a "navigable water" in the Act should
apply to the determination of navigability USAC seeks. But the parties did not
present the Act's definition of navigability to the district court. And while the
district court did recognize that USAC' s right to access public waters flows from
the Act, it also failed to apply the Act's definition. It was therefore plain error for
the court to apply a different definition of navigability.
Rather than applying the Act's definition of navigability, the district court
applied the federal test for navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine.
This test required the court to evaluate statehood-era evidence of trade and
travel on the one-mile stretch of the Weber River. That evidence was limited to
intermittent log drives that occurred during spring runoff. But under the federal
test, log drives are not enough; evidence of boat travel is also required. In
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addition, under the federal test, evidence of the requisite trade and travel on a
specific waterway must be more than trade and travel during times of temporary
high water. The evidence here was of use only during such periods. The district
court therefore erred by misinterpreting and misapplying the federal test for
navigability.
Orange Street Development respectfully asks this court to reverse the
district court's judgment declaring that the one-mile stretch of the Weber River is
navigable and finding the State holds title to that streambed.
Statement of the Issues

Issue 1: Did the district court err in declaring that "the State of Utah holds
sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber" River where it crosses the
landowners' properties and in issuing a judgment in favor of USAC to this effect
where USAC lacked standing to request this relief?
Standard of Review: Standing is "generally a question of law," reviewed
by this court for correctness. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5,

~

7,

201 P.3d 1004.
Preservation: "[S]tanding is a jurisdictional requirement" and "can be
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal." Brown v. Div. of Water
Rights of the Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14,

~

13,228 P.3d 747. The State raised
i

the issue of USAC' s standing to litigate the question of title to the riverbed at
R.861.
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Issue 2: Did the district court err when it failed to apply Utah's Public
Waters Access Act's definition of "navigable water" to the question of whether
the Act permits USAC to use the Weber River for recreational activity where it
crosses the landowners' properties?
Standard of Review: When a party fails to preserve an issue below, this
court reviews that issue "under the manifest injustice or plain error standard."
State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9,

~

11, 154 P.3d 788.

Preservation: This issue is not preserved.
Issue 3: Did the district court err when it concluded under the federal test
of navigability for title that the Weber River is navigable where it crosses the
landowners' properties based solely on evidence of statehood-era log floats
where controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent indicates evidence of
statehood-era boat travel is also required?
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's conclusions of
law de novo. In reAdoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35,

~

41, 308 P.3d 382.

Preservation: Orange Street preserved this issue at R.733, 740, 745-54 and
978:36-39.
Issue 4: Did the district court err when it concluded under the federal test
of navigability for title that the Weber River is navigable where it crosses the
landowners' properties based solely on log drives that occurred during spring
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runoff where controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires that a river's
utility for trade and travel not be limited to times of temporary high water?
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's conclusions of
law de novo. In reAdoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35, ,-r 41,308 P.3d 382.
Preservation: Orange Street preserved this issue at R.752-54.
Determinative Provisions

Two provisions of the Public Waters Access Act, Utah Code sections 73-29102 and 73-29-201, are determinative and are attached as Addendum B.
Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

On May 5, 2011, the Utah Stream Access Coalition ("USAC"), filed a
complaint against Orange Street Development ("Orange Street"), James Park,
Wendell and Ila Stembridge, and Vern and Dorothy Stembridge (collectively, the
"landowners")- all of whom own property located along a one-mile stretch of
the Weber River. USAC also sued the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
("DWR"), the Utah Division of Parks and Recreation ("DPR"), and the sheriff of
Summit County. (R.1-3.) USAC alleged that the Weber River, where it passes
through the landowners' properties, was navigable at the time of Utah's
statehood, that the State of Utah holds title to the streambed and that, as a result,
the public has the right to enter and use the streambed. (R.4-5.) USAC alleged
that the landowners have prevented members of USAC from entering and using
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the streambed, and that DWR, DPR, and the sheriff have used-or threatened to
use-their legal authority to cite for criminal trespass members of the public who
access and use the streambed of the river where it crosses the landowners'
properties without the landowners' permission. (R.S-6.) USAC sought relief in
the form of a declaratory judgment that under the Act the public has the right to
access and use the river and streambed where it crosses the landowners'
properties. (R.S-9,560.) USAC also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions
enjoining the defendants from interfering with public access to the river and
streambed. (R.S-10.)
Defendants each answered the complaint. (R.53-60,61-67,68-74,75-82,8387.) Thereafter, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of DWR, DPR, and the

sheriff from the action, substituting the Utah Division of Forestry, Fire, and State
Lands (the "State"). (R.123-24.) The parties also stipulated that Park and the
Stembridge parties would not participate in the litigation in any way, but would
be bound by the district court's rulings. (R.526-28,768-70.) Thus, only USAC,
Orange Street, and the State participated in the litigation and presented evidence
and argument at trial. The State viewed its role in the litigation as advisory and
took "no formal position" as to whether the one-mile stretch of the Weber River
was navigable, but ultimately expressed doubt as to "whether the Weber meets
the applicable test" for navigability. (R.674;676;974:29-31;978:53-54.)
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Prior to trial, the parties sought to clarify the scope of USAC' s requested
relief. They filed a stipulation with the court acknowledging that the court's
ruling would apply only to the stretch of the Weber River where it crosses the
landowners' properties, and would not affect other properties upstream or
downstream. (R.237-41.) The State also filed a motion to limit the scope of the
court's findings and conclusions, alternatively labeling it a motion to dismiss.
(R.242-44,248-320.) This motion addressed the State's concern that the court's
decision would "affect the interest of hundreds of riverfront landowners along
the Weber River not named in this action." (R.253.) USAC opposed the State's
motion, and in doing so stated as follows:
The Coalition is not seeking to quiet title to the streambed. It seeks a
right of access and use only. Depending on the ultimate
determination of navigability in this case, the State may in the future
decide to bring quiet title actions against the Landowner Defendants
and other riparian landowners; however, neither the Coalition nor
the State is attempting to assert such claims here.
(R.337.)
The State ultimately withdrew its motion, and USAC and the State filed a
second stipulation regarding the scope of USAC's requested relief. (R.498-502.)
USAC and the State agreed that the court could make findings regarding
activities that occurred along the "[b]roader [r]each" of the Weber River, but that
"title-implicating findings and conclusions should be limited" to the stretch of
river where it crosses the landowners' properties. (R.499-500.)

7

The parties each filed a trial brief. (R.557-82,643-77,731-55.) In USAC's trial
brief it explained-for the first time-that it sought access to the riverbed
pursuant to the Public Waters Access Act, Utah Code sections 73-29-201 through
-208. (R.560.)
The district court held a four-day bench trial in February 2015, followed by
one day of closing arguments in March 2015. (R.765-67,771-78,850,974-78.) The
court issued its Legal Analysis, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
April10, 2015. (R.867-92; attached as Add. C.) The district court found in favor of
USAC and issued a declaratory judgment that the Weber River uwhere it passes
by and through the Landowner Properties" was navigable at the time of
statehood and that USAC' s u members and the general public are entitled to use
the riverbed of the Weber River at [that location] for lawful recreational
purposes," citing Utah Code section 73-29-201(1). (R.892.) In addition, the court
declared that uthe State of Utah holds sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber
below the ordinary high water mark at the location of the Landowner
Properties." (R.892.) The court issued an injunction preventing the landowners
from interfering with the public's right to access the streambed. (R.892.)
The district court issued its final judgment on May 19, 2015. (R.948-51;
attached as Add. D.) Orange Street timely appealed. (R.952-54.)

8

2.

Statement of the Facts
The parties agreed that the central issue in this case was whether the one-

mile stretch of the Weber River was navigable on January 4,1896, the date Utah
entered the Union. (R.647,732,868.) The district court was therefore tasked with
deciding how to determine whether the one-mile stretch of the Weber River was
navigable at statehood, and whether the evidence presented by USAC at trial
was sufficient to prove that the Weber River was navigable at that time .I
(R.868,872.)
2.1

The parties presented the district court with different
interpretations of the rule for determining navigability

The parties agreed that the basic formulation of the test to be used by the
district court to determine navigability was articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in 1870: "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water." (R.561,648,739); The Daniel

Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870). And the parties agreed that the
navigability determination should be made based on the "natural and ordinary"
condition of the river at statehood. (R.561-62,649,741,745-46.)

USAC and Orange Street agreed that USAC bore the burden of proving
navigability by a preponderance of the evidence. (R.738;974:14;978:41-42.)
1

9

But the parties' agreement regarding the navigability rule ended there.
They disagreed as to the nuances of the navigability test, and two issues in
particular: (1) whether the test requires a showing of both trade and travel- in
other words, whether log drives alone are sufficient to establish navigabilityand (2) whether log drives that occur during seasonal runoff are evidence of
navigability.
USAC argued that log drives, alone, are sufficient to establish navigability.
(R.567.) It claimed that the navigability inquiry has "no requirement of transport

by particular vessels, or of transport for hire, either of passengers or goods."
(R.567.) USAC argued that "[t]rade and travel is not a phrase that limits the

mode of transport. It just means you have to have movement from one place to
another up or down the river, it just reinforces the highway concept." (R.978:1718.) USAC also argued that because courts have never said log drives alone are
not enough to support a navigability finding, boat travel is not necessarily an

element of the navigability test. (R.974:17-18.)
Orange Street, on the other hand, argued that the United States Supreme
Court has never held that log drives, alone, are sufficient to establish navigability
for title purposes. (R.733,740.) And log drives alone are insufficient because the
Court's focus in navigability for title cases is actual navigation. (R.740-42.) Orange
Street explained that the test for navigability "has always required evidence of
both trade and travel," and that to demonstrate travel, there must be evidence of
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navigability by boats of the kind used at statehood. (R.745-49.) It argued that
"trade and travel mean[] two different things," where trade is "the movement of
goods up and down the river," which can be established by evidence of log
drives, but travel "is the movement of things by boat, perhaps barges" and
cannot be established by evidence of log drives. (R.978:36-38.)
The State agreed with Orange Street that the test for navigability requires
that both trade and travel be possible. (R.649,861-62.) And while recognizing that
evidence of log drives is probative of navigability, the State agreed that "[t]he
majority of cases ... rely upon susceptibility to some kind of boat travel as an
indicium of navigability." (R.650-52.) The State urged the court to "treat[] boat
travel as an important indicator within the navigability analysis." (R.863.)
As to the issue of whether log drives that occurred during seasonal runoff
are sufficient to establish whether a river was used for "trade and travel," USAC
argued that "the seasonal or sporadic nature of the log drives on the Weber and
other Western rivers does not detract from their navigability." (R.568.) This is so,
USAC suggested, because seasonal log drives were still regular and dependable
enough to allow a river to be "a highway of useful commerce." (R.568-69;974:1920;978:19-20 (quotations and emphasis omitted).)
In contrast, Orange Street argued that seasonal log drives cannot constitute
evidence of navigability because those drives are only "occasional" and occur "in
times of high water." (R.754.) Orange Street also argued that log drives that occur
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"only in seven or eight percent of the year" do not necessarily represent waters
in their "natural and ordinary condition." (R.978:49.)
The State identified the issue of whether a river is navigable where log
drives are "limited to temporary times of high water" as possibly "[t]he most
important legal question in this case." (R.656,863-64 (quotations omitted).) It
recognized that "courts accept that navigable conditions need not prevail the
entire year, but nevertheless require that they not be confined to temporary times
of high water." (R.658.) The State described this rule as a "practical limitation"
that "draws a line that excludes streams that are too small to be realistically
useful except in times of high water." (R.863.)
2.2

The parties presented evidence at trial regarding the navigability
of the Weber River

At trial, USAC called three witnesses to testify. First, Kristofor Olson, the
president of USAC, testified that prior to 2010 he and other members of the
public utilized the Weber River where it crosses the landowners' properties for
fishing. (R.974:42.) Olson and others would access the river from Brown's
Canyon Bridge or by crossing private property with the permission of a
landowner. (R.974:42.) He stopped fishing this stretch of the Weber in 2010 when
"[s]tate law changed" and "[n]o trespassing signs specific to the use of the river
bed went up right at Brown's Canyon Bridge." (R.974:43.) Olson explained that
USAC filed this lawsuit in order to "allow us the type of access and ... use that
we had before" 2010. (R.974:43.)
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USAC' s second witness was its expert, Sara Dant, a professor of history at
Weber State University. (R.974:46.) Dant testified in great detail regarding
statehood-era evidence of commercial use of the upper Weber River, including
the portion of the river that crosses the landowners' properties, and specifically
about log drives that were conducted on the upper Weber River and the
economic importance of those drives to the region's development and economy.
(R. 974:84-249;975:6-97.)
Based on the evidence she examined, Dant testified that she was
"completely confident" that railroad tie drives occurred on the upper Weber in
1877 and 1879. (R.974:128-29;Tr.Ex.64.) She testified that it was "reasonable to
conclude" that there were drives in 1880, 1881, and 1882, and that it was
"reasonable to suspect" that there was a drive in 1883.
(R.974:138,143,148,150;Tr.Ex.64.) And she testified "with reservation" that there
was another tie drive in 1896. (R.974:153-54;Tr.Ex.64.) Dant also suggested that it
"was likely" that there were other drives during this time. (R.974:157;Tr.Ex.64.)
As to the driving of mining timbers, cordwood, and saw logs, Dant
testified about a timber drive that was attempted- but failed due to low waterin 1888, partially successful in 1889 (another low water year), and completed in
1890. (R.974:173-77,194-95,232;Tr.Ex.64.) Dant testified regarding "indications"
that other timber or cordwood drives were conducted in 1891 and 1892.
(R.974:197-99.) Dant also discussed the sawmills that were located along the
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Weber River and explained that logs were floated to the sawmills, but milled
lumber was probably hauled overland to its final destination rather than put
back into the river. (R.974:198-203;975:78-85,88-89.)
Dant testified that "most" of these drives would have passed through the
landowners' properties. (R.974:231.) She explained that "[m]any of the accounts
we have suggest that the bulk of the timber is coming from the East Weber, the
headwaters area and it's being floated first to Echo and later to Wanship and in
order for that to happen, it would have had to have passed through what is now
property of the defendants." (R.974:231.) Dant also testified that the log drives
occurred during spring runoff (R.974:107-09,137-38,170,208,229.) She also
explained that she found no evidence of "alterations to the natural stream
channel or flow to assist the log drives," and no evidence of splash or wing dams
on the Weber River. (R.974:212-213;975:74-75.) And Dant testified that other log
drives-similar to those that occurred on the Weber-took place on the Provo,
Bear, and Blacks Fork Rivers during the same period of time. (R.974:23641;975:75.)
Finally, Dant testified that she found no evidence of commercial boat
travel on the Weber River where it crosses the landowners' properties during the
statehood era. (R.975:76.)
USAC' s final witness, Gary Nichols- a kayaker, canoer, licensed river
guide, and author of a book on river running in Utah-offered expert testimony
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regarding the present-day characteristics of the Weber River from Holiday Park
to Wanship, and from Wanship to Echo. (R.975:98-101;115-17.) As to the Holiday
Park to Wanship segment, Nichols testified that it is "seasonally floatable today,
by small river watercraft." (R.975:128.) He explained that this segment is not
boatable year round, but can be floated "sometimes as early as late April, but the
latter part of May through June and sometimes early July[] are the main times."
(R.975:121.) As to the segment from Wanship to Echo, Nichols testified that this
segment is boatable during the irrigation season, which is usually more than two
months in length, and is "very capable" of floating with a kayak, canoe, or raft.
(R.975:132-33,135-36.) Nichols also testified that he has seen logs floating in the
river, including logs the size of railroad ties. (R.975:107,110-12,128-29,136-37,17374,193-95.)
Orange Street likewise called three witnesses at trial. Its first witness,
David Dassing- a kayaker, river runner, and former river guide who resides in
Peoa, Utah-testified that the upper Weber River can be run during only a few
weeks each year, or for "a couple of weeks as it ramps up and then a couple
weeks as it ramps down" during the spring runoff. (R.975:199-201,206-207.)
Next, Stewart Grow, the general partner of Orange Street, testified that
Orange Street owns approximately fifteen acres in Peoa, Utah, on Browns
Canyon Road, and that the Weber River bisects that property. (R.976:4-6.) Grow,
himself, also owns eleven acres directly downstream from the Orange Street
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property. (R.976:5-6.) Grow testified that approximately two of the total twentysix acres is covered by the bed of the Weber River. (R.976:12.) Grow and Orange
Street purchased their acreage in 1993, including the riverbed, and Grow has
paid property taxes on the twenty-six acres-including the two acres of
riverbed-since that time. (R.976:11-13.) Grow testified that he placed "no
trespassing" signs on the property ten to fifteen years ago. (R.976:7-8.)
Grow testified regarding the condition of the Weber River where it crosses
Orange Street's property. (R.976:16-18.) And he testified regarding points at
which the public can access the Weber River in the vicinity of Orange Street's
property. (R.976:26-28.) Grow testified that approximately twelve times a year
fishermen will come to his property and ask if they can fish. (R.976:28.) On all but
one occasion, he allowed the fishermen to access and use the Weber River where
it crosses his property. (R.976:28-29.)

Orange Street's final witness was its expert, Thomas Alexander, an
emeritus professor of history from Brigham Young University. (R.976:42.)
Alexander reviewed and evaluated Dant' s report and the evidence Dant used in
preparing her report. (R. 976:46-47.) Although he characterized Dant' s work as "a
careful report," he did not agree with many of her conclusions regarding log
drives on the Weber River. (R.976:49,53;Tr.Ex.85.) He agreed log drives occurred
in 1880 and 1881, as well as 1890, but disagreed that the evidence was sufficient
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to conclude that log drives took place in any other year. 2 (R.976:55,74-91,11426,190-92;Tr.Ex.85.) He also suggested that the evidence shows that the
riverbanks had to be improved in order to accommodate log drives, specifically
by building up the banks of the river and with wing dams. (R.976:71-72,106.)
Alexander also testified that there was no evidence of travel or the
transport of people up or down the Weber River where it crosses the
landowners' properties at the time of statehood. (R.976:104.) And Alexander
opined that Dant' s research and evidence regarding log drives on rivers other
than the Weber, are "not particularly relevant" to this case. (R.976:108.)
Alexander also testified about the various sawmills located along the upper
Weber River in the statehood era. (R.976:98-103,174-86.)
The State called two expert witnesses. First, Jedediah Rogers, senior state
historian for the Utah Division of State History, testified regarding his review of
Dant's sources and report and Alexander's report. (R.976:205,209.) Rogers agreed
with Dant that there was "conclusive evidence" of a log drive on the upper
Weber River in 1877, and "a possible or likely" drive in 1879. (R.976:211-15.) He
identified "direct evidence of a drive in 1880," another drive in 1881, and a
"likely" drive in 1882. (R.976:216-21;977:55-56.) In contrast to Dant, Rogers could
not conclude that a log drive took place in 1883, explaining that he found "only
evidence that a ... drive was expected or wanted in '83." (R.976:221.) Rogers
Alexander did not review or consider evidence of pre-1880 log drive activity on
the upper Weber River. (R.976:55,111;Tr.Ex.85.)

2

17

determined that a drive was attempted in 1888, but the timber became
"stranded" because of low water somewhere above the landowners' properties.
(R.976:222-28;977:4-6,68-72.) According to Rogers, that timber "may have" been
driven down the river in 1889, but" a full-length drive from the upper reaches of
the Weber down to Wanship likely did not happen." (R.977:6,72.) Rogers testified
that the drive did occur in 1890. (R.977:6,72-73.)
Rogers testified that a log drive occurred in 1892 on the upper Weber, but
it did not pass through the landowners' properties. (R.977:7-8.) Finally, Rogers
cited "inconclusive evidence of a drive in [18]96." (R.977:8-9,75-78.) Rogers
testified that he found no evidence of any type of log drive after that year.
(R.977:9.)
Rogers also testified that the "sources are consistent" that the log drives on
the upper Weber occurred "during the spring runoff," but the sources do not
discuss the duration of the log drives. (R.977:35-36.) And Rogers testified that the
"window of time ... for sufficient driving flows" did not "materialize every year
on the Weber River" during the statehood era. (R.977:38.)
Rogers, too, testified about sawmills on the upper Weber River. (R.977:1335,81-83,88-102.) Roger also discussed Dant's evaluation of log drives on the
Provo, Bear, and Black's Fork Rivers, stating that those drives do not "tell[] us
anything directly about the Weber River, whether it saw log drives or ...
whether the Weber River was driveable or susceptible to be driven." (R.977:41-
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42.) And, finally, Rogers testified that he found no evidence of boating on the
upper Weber River during the time in question. (R.977:52-53.)
The State's second expert witness, Candice Hasenyager, an engineer with
the Utah Division of Water Resources, testified regarding the dynamics and
"floatability" of the Weber River. (R.977:124-25.) Among other things,
Hasenyager discussed the Oakley gauge, which began recording flow data on
the Weber River in Oakley in 1904, and has run continuously since then.
(R.977:136.) She testified that the data from the Oakley gauge show variability in
flow of the river from year to year, and variability in the week in which the flow
peaks. (R.977:140-41.) Hasenyager also testified that the flow of the Weber River
measured at the Oakley gauge is "usually less" than the flow of the Green,
Duchesne, White, San Juan, and Bear Rivers. (R.977:158-60.) And Hasenyager
testified regarding factors, such as spring runoff and snow pack, that affect the
mean annual flow of a river. (R.977:181-82.)
2.3

The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law

On April10, 2015, the district court entered its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (R.867-92.) The district court identified the issue in this case
as "whether members of the public may use for recreation- including fishingthe riverbed on the 'one-mile stretch' of the Weber River adjacent to the
Landowners Defendants' properties," and explained that this question required
the court to determine whether the one-mile stretch was navigable at statehood.
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(R.868.) If it was, then under Utah Code section 73-29-201(1), "the riverbed is
state sovereign land and members of the public have the right under state law to
use it for recreation." (R.868.) In a footnote, the court explained that the Public
Waters Access Act overruled Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48,194 P.3d 897, and
that Conatser "held that the public has a right to use the beds of all waters in the
state." (R.868.) The court added, "[a]s state law stands today, Utahans are
allowed to use the beds of rivers where they cross private lands only if the rivers
are navigable for title purposes under federal law." (R.868.)
The court first explained the analytical model by which it determined
whether the one-mile stretch of the Weber River was navigable at statehood.
(R.868-72.) Next, it detailed its findings of fact. (R.872-88.) And finally, it applied
its analytical model to the facts, and reached the conclusion that the Weber River
where it crosses the landowners' properties was navigable at statehood. (R.88892.)
Addressing the standard for navigability, the district court explained that
it would apply the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball:
111

Rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being

used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water."' (R.869 (quoting 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870).) The district court
also explained that navigability must be fixed as of the time of statehood, and
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that the navigability determination is ubased on the natural and ordinary
condition of the water." (R.869 (quotations omitted).)
As to the type of evidence needed to demonstrate navigability, the district
court said u[d]etermining navigability is not limited to considering whether ships
or boats can pass through the Weber River at the one-mile stretch." (R.870.)
Rather, it explained that other courts "have ruled that log drives are a basis for
establishing navigability in a title case," though it acknowledged that the most
recent navigability for title case from the United States Supreme Court u did not
discuss the issue of log drives." (R.870-71.) But the district court observed that
the U.S. Supreme Court" did not rule out the potential for finding navigability
based upon log drive evidence." (R.871.)
The district court also discussed the "seasonality of log drives or other
navigational uses" and its relevance to a navigability determination: "The fact
that, during certain seasons of a year, a waterway may not be useful for
commerce or trade should not bar a finding of navigability ... provided that the
waterway was regularly used for commerce on a seasonal basis, and was not
dependent on unusual conditions for use in commerce." (R.871.) The court stated
that u[e]vidence of regular seasonal commerce can satisfy the Daniel
Ball/navigability-for-title test." (R.872.)
Proceeding to its findings of fact, the court first discussed flows on the
upper Weber River, or the section of the river from its headwaters near Holiday
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Park to Echo. (R.875.) It recited flow data from the Oakley gauge and observed
that "the bulk of the Weber's flow comes in the spring runoff season, typically
during the months of May and June." (R.876.) It found that "present-day flows
on the Upper Weber above[] Oakley are not materially different than they were
at statehood." (R.877.) Additionally, the court explained that it found "the expert
testimony of ... Nichols to be persuasive on the present-day conditions and
characteristics of the Upper Weber and the flows at which it is capable of floating
small recreational boats and cut logs 8-10ft. long during normal spring flows,"
concluding on the basis of that testimony that "the Upper Weber can easily float
small recreational boats and cut logs 8-10ft. in length at flows above 500 ds."
(R.877-78.) And the court found that" general conditions and characteristics on
the Upper Weber during the statehood era or in 1896 were not materially
different than present-day conditions and characteristics." (R.878.)
Next, the court addressed log drives on the upper Weber River, explaining
that it found Dant' s testimony persuasive. (R.879.) The district court observed
that "[r]iver drives were a critical component of the railroad and railroad tie
industries," and that "[r]ivers that connected the timber forests in the mountains
with a railroad line were chosen for these drives." (R.879.) Specifically, "[i]n 1869,
the Union Pacific extended the Transcontinental Railroad to Echo, Utah, and
established a connection between the railroad and the Upper Weber River."
(R.880.) Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the court
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concluded that tie drives occurred on the Weber River in 1877, 1879, 1880, 1881,
and 1882. (R.881-82,889.) It also concluded that there is a "strong possibility" that
a tie drive also occurred in 1883 and that "it is more probable than not" that a
drive took place in 1896. (R.882-83,889.) And the court explained that "[i]t is
likely that other tie drives occurred on the Upper Weber during the 1870s
through the 1890s that would have passed through the Landowner Properties,
although exact dates and circumstances are not specifically documented in the
historical record." (R.883.)
The court also noted that tie drives are documented on the upper Bear
River, the Blacks Fork River, and the Provo River in "spring runoff conditions"
during the statehood era. (R.884.) The court observed that these rivers" are
similar in size and flow to the Upper Weber, and have similar characteristics in
terms of seasonal runoff, bed composition, some braiding, continuous steep
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gradients, Class 1-3 rapids and no permanent obstacles to navigation by small
recreational boats or cut logs during normal spring flows," and that "these
similarities also existed in the statehood era." (R.884.)

I
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Next, the court discussed the driving of mining timbers and cordwood on
the upper Weber River. (R.885.) It found that a drive was begun in 1888, but that
it was "tied up" due to "low water." (R.885.) The drive resumed in 1889, and the
court found that the logs "passed through the Landowner Properties either in
1888 or in 1889, depending on where in Peoa they were hung up," and the drive
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was ultimately completed in 1890. (R.885-86,889.) As with railroad ties, the court
found that "[i]t is likely that other drives of mining timber and cordwood
occurred on the Upper Weber that would have passed through the Landowner
Properties during the 1880s and 90s, although exact dates and circumstances of
the drives are not specifically documented in the historical record." (R.886-87.)
Finally, the court found that "[i]n the 1880s and 1890s, logs were floated
down the Weber River from the upper Weber canyon to various sawmills located
along the river to be processed into lumber." (R.887.) Moreover, the court found
that some of these logs would have passed through the landowners' properties.
(R.887-88.)
Applying these facts to the navigability analysis, the court concluded that
the upper Weber was used as an actual "highway of commerce" for railroad ties
during the late 1870s through 1896, and that "[i]t is likely that most of this
commerce passed through the Landowner Properties." (R.888.) Likewise, during
the 1880s and 1890s, the river was used as a "highway of commerce" for mining
timbers and cordwood, and "[i]t is likely that a large portion of this commerce
passed through the Landowner Properties." (R.888.) And during the same
period, the river served as a "highway of commerce" for transporting logs to
sawmills along the river, and " [s ]orne of this commerce passed through the
Landowner Properties." (R.888.)

24

The court explained that "there is no evidence suggesting that absence of
documented drives on the Upper Weber during other years leading up to
statehood was due to unfavorable river conditions," except during the drive that
occurred from 1888 to 1889. (R.889.) Thus, the court found that "the Upper
Weber was susceptible of being used for log and tie drives under normal
conditions throughout the statehood era, including in 1896." (R.889-90.) The
court also noted that the documented drives on other Utah rivers during the
same time period confirm that finding. (R.890.)
The court found that the log drives were "conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel over water," "occurred on the Upper Weber in its
natural condition," and were "usefully and dependably performed during
ordinary spring runoff conditions." (R.890-91.) The court also found that the log
drives constituted "useful commerce." (R.891.) Finally, the court explained,
"[w]here it passes by and through the Landowner Properties, the Weber River
was, at the time of statehood, used and susceptible of being used, in its natural
and ordinary condition, as [a] highway of commerce, over which trade and travel
were conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over water. Thus, it
is navigable in fact." (R.891.)
Because it found the upper Weber River where it passes through the
landowners' properties to be navigable in fact, the court concluded that it was
navigable in law, and because it is navigable in law, "the State of Utah holds
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sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber below the ordinary high water mark
at the location of the Landowner Properties." (R.892.) As a result, under Utah
Code section 73-29-201(1), members of USAC and the public "are entitled to use
the riverbed of the Weber River ... for lawful recreational purposes." (R.892.)
On May 19,2015, the district court entered a final judgment consistent
with these findings and conclusions. (R.948-51.) The court ordered Orange Street
and the other landowners "to remove any no trespassing signs from their
properties that ... are inconsistent with the public's rights" to use and access the
river," and to take no further actions interfering with such public rights." (R.950.)
Summary of the Argument

USAC lacks standing to challenge title to the bed of the Weber River where
it crosses the landowners' properties. USAC asserts no interest in the property at
issue sufficient to confer standing to challenge title to that property. Moreover,
the Public Waters Access Act does not provide a statutory basis for members of
the public to assert a claim for title on the State's behalf. And USAC conceded
that it is not seeking to quiet title to the riverbed. The district court therefore
erred in determining that the State holds title to the riverbed.
Moreover, the district court applied the wrong test for determining
whether the Weber River is "navigable" for purposes of the Public Waters Access
Act. This is because the district court applied the federal navigability for title test
to determine access, when the Act itself has its own test for a "navigable water,"

26

I~

rI
a test that on its face is different than the federal title test. The failure to apply the
state test was plain error because the Act's applicability should have been
obvious to the trial court and its application would have resulted in a more
favorable outcome for Orange Street.
But even if the district court did not err in applying the federal navigability
for title test, it misinterpreted that test in two ways. First, the federal test requires
[:

that a river have been used for both trade and travel at statehood. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently equated travel with boat travel, and the
Court has never indicated that log drive evidence may substitute for evidence of
boat travel. The district court therefore erred in finding the Weber River to be
navigable where it crosses the landowners' properties because of the complete
absence of evidence of statehood-era boat travel.
Second, the federal test prohibits a finding of navigability where trade and
travel occur only during times of temporary high water. The district court failed
to recognize this limitation, and erred in finding the Weber River to be navigable
based on evidence of log drives that occurred only during the spring runoff-a
time of temporary high water.

!I
I

Argument

This case is about whether members of the Utah Stream Access Coalition
("USAC") are permitted to fish or otherwise use for recreational purposes the
bed of the Weber River where it crosses the private property of Orange Street
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Development COrange Street") and other private landowners. The Public
Waters Access Act (the" Act") identifies the public waters that the public may
use for recreational activities, and therefore is determinative of whether USAC
may fish from this riverbed. The Act provides that the public may use for
recreation public waters that (i) are "navigable water[ s]"; (ii) are "on public
property"; or (iii) are "on private property ... with the private property owner's
permission." Utah Code§ 73-29-201(1), (2).
USAC seeks to establish that it has the right to fish from Orange Street's
riverbed under the first of these alternatives- because the Weber River, where it
crosses Orange Street's property, is navigable under the federal navigability for
title test. (R.8-9.) It also prays for a judgment that, as a consequence of that test,
the State holds title to that portion of the riverbed. (R.8-9.) But USAC is not
entitled to declaratory judgments supporting any of its claims. First, USAC lacks
standing to challenge Orange Street's and the other landowners' title to the
riverbed, and the district court erred in adjudicating title. Second, the district
court failed to apply the navigability analysis specified in the Act. And third,
even if the district court applied the correct test-the federal test of navigability
for title- the court misinterpreted and misapplied that test. This court should
reverse.
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1.

USAC does not have standing to ask for a declaratory judgment that the
State holds title to the riverbed

In Utah, standing is a jurisdictional requirement. Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013
UT 18, ,-r 9, 299 P.3d 1098. Without it, a case is not "fit for judicial resolution."
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ,-r 17, 148 P.3d

960 (quotations omitted). Because USAC lacked standing to request a declaration
that title to the bed of the Weber River is held by the State of Utah," the district
II

court lacked jurisdiction to issue a judgment that "the State of Utah holds
sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber River" where it crosses the
landowners' properties. (R.8-9,892,949.)
The traditional test for standing "addresses whether the party has a real
and personal interest in the dispute." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ,-r 20 (quotations
omitted). In the context of an action challenging title, only those who may have
claims to an interest in land have standing. As this court has phrased it, standing
II

is limited to parties who could acquire an interest in the property created by the

court's judgment or decree." Elder v. Nephi City ex rel. Brough, 2007 UT 46, ,-r 20,
164 P.3d 1238.
Here, USAC lacks standing under this test to assert a claim that another
party-the State-holds title to the riverbed where it crosses the landowners'
properties. USAC seeks access to the riverbed for recreational use. It is allegedly
injured because it is prohibited from using that riverbed if the riverbed is
privately owned and the owner does not permit access and use. Utah Code § 73-
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29-201(1), (2). USAC does not assert that it holds title to or any other possessory
interest in the riverbed; indeed, it does not even assert that it "could acquire" any
interest in the riverbed as a result of the court's judgment. (See R.337.) Rather, it
asserts that the State holds title to the riverbed, and because the State holds title, it
c

should have access to the water for recreation. (R.S.) But the State itself has not
asserted that it holds title to the riverbed or initiated a quiet title action. As this
court has recognized, because a party with the requisite interest in land -like the
State- may "decline to perfect his claim," parties lacking that interest should not
be allowed to "command rulings" affecting title. Elder, 2007 UT 46, ,-r 19.
It is true that USAC's injury-in the technical sense-is affected by

whether the State holds title to the riverbed because Utah Code section 73-29201(1)(a)(ii) allows access to waters "on public property." That is, if the State
holds title to the riverbed, the riverbed is public property that USAC can use for
recreational purposes. But the Act's premising access on public ownership of
property does not establish a basis for members of the public to assert title on the
State's behalf. The Act itself addresses quiet title actions that enable members of
the public "to obtain a judicial declaration of the existence of a right to public
recreational access" in section 73-29-204(1)(a). But that provision does not grant
standing to USAC to assert the State's claim to title to the landowners' riverbeds
under the equal footing doctrine. Rather, it allows the public to establish
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recreational easements under section 73-29-203,3 not quiet title in the State or
wrest title from private property owners. The Act therefore recognizes the right
of the public to use public waters on existing public property or establish
easements for such use over private property under certain conditions. It does
not allow the public to assert and adjudicate public ownership of riverbeds on
the State's behalf. USAC lacks standing to do just that.
USAC likewise lacks alternative standing to raise the issue of title to the
riverbed where it crosses the landowners' properties. A party has alternative
standing if it can demonstrate "that it has the interest necessary to effectively
assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual
questions and that the issues are unlikely to be raised if [it] is denied standing."
Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ,-r 36 (quotations omitted). "[I]t must also demonstrate

that the issues it seeks to raise are of sufficient public importance in and of
themselves to warrant granting the party standing." Id. ,-r 39.

3 Section 73-29-203 provides as follows:
(1) Public recreational access is established if:
(a) the private property has been used by the public for recreational
access requiring use of the public water for a period of at least 10
consecutive years that begins after September 22, 1982; and
(b) the public use has been:
(i) continuous during the season conducive to the recreational
access;
(ii) open and notorious;
(iii) adverse; and
(iv) without interruption.
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USAC has proved capable of assisting the court in evaluating many of the
legal and factual issues in this case. But because it is not asserting its own interest
in the riverbed, it cannot assist the court in making a title determination in the
same way that parties with an interest in the property could. USAC, unlike the
State or the landowners, will not bear responsibility for the riverbed no matter
the result of the title determination. Only the State and the landowners can
provide the court with a complete analysis respecting the benefits and burdens of
holding title. And as noted above, the State has declined to assert a claim for title.
In the context of adjudicating access to public waters for recreational purposes,

title determinations- especially in favor of parties not seeking title- are not" of
sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant granting" USAC
standing. Id. ,-r 39.
Importantly, USAC has conceded that it "is not seeking to quiet title to the
streambed." (R.337.) As it explained,
[i]t seeks a right of access and use only. Depending on the ultimate
determination of navigability in this case, the State may in the future
decide to bring quiet title actions against the Landowner Defendants
and other riparian landowners; however, neither the Coalition nor
the State is attempting to assert such claims here.
(R.337.) The State agreed, arguing in its closing as follows:
The State reiterates that this is not a quiet title case. Only the State
and private landowner claimants have standing to quiet title to the
subject riverbed lands, and no quiet title cause of action has been
pled. Instead, the Coalition's claims seek injunctive relief for access.
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(R.861.) And the State specifically excluded title-related findings from its
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R.928.)
Oddly, the district court did not acknowledge USAC' s concession, never
addressed the State's argument or proposed findings, and did not consider the
issue of standing. It simply concluded that "the State of Utah holds sovereign
land title to the bed of the Weber" where it crosses the landowners' properties
and issued a judgment to that effect in USAC's favor. (R.892,949.) In doing so, the
court erred because USAC lacked standing to assert a claim for a declaration that
the State holds title to the riverbed. The district court's entry of judgment
declaring the State to hold title to the riverbed should be vacated, and USAC' s
claim for a title determination dismissed. See Gregory, 2013 UT 18,

~

37.

In addition to erroneously focusing on establishing title to the riverbed of
the Weber River, the district court also erred by applying the wrong test for
navigability. Instead, the court should have applied the definition of navigability
found in the Public Waters Access Act itself.
2.

It was plain error for the district court to have failed to apply the

statutory definition of "navigable water" to the question of whether
USAC may fish on the Weber River where it crosses the landowners'
properties under state law
As noted above, the operative question in this case is whether members of
the public, including USAC, may use the bed of the Weber River where it crosses
the landowners' properties for recreational purposes. USAC sought access on the
basis that the river is "navigable," and that the Act grants access to "navigable
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water." (R.8-10,560.) But in determining whether the river is navigable, the
district court did not apply the definition of a "[n]avigable water" contained in
the Act. Instead, it applied the federal test of navigability for title under the equal
footing doctrine. It was plain error for the district court not to have applied the
Act's definition.
None of the parties raised the fact that the Act defines navigability for
purposes of determining recreational access to public waters in terms that
diverge from the federal title test. 4 As a result, this court should review the issue
under the plain error standard. State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ,-r 11, 154 P.3d 788.
Under that standard, Orange Street must demonstrate that" (i) an error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ,-r 15, 361 P.3d 104
(quotations and brackets omitted).
An error occurred in this case when the district court applied the wrong
navigability test. The court correctly acknowledged that "[t]he issue in this case
is whether members of the public may use for recreation- including fishing- the
riverbed on the 'one-mile stretch' of the Weber River adjacent to the Landowner
Defendants' properties." (R.868 (emphasis added).) And the court

Additionally, the parties agreed that the federal test of navigability for title was
the operative rule. (R.561,648,739.)

4
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acknowledged that "[t]his question requires the Court to determine whether the
Weber River in this stretch is 'navigable' under the applicable legal definition."
(R.868.) The court applied the federal test of navigability for title under the equalfooting doctrine. (R.868-70.) But the correct legal standard is the definition of
"[n]avigable water" in the statute itself, as section 73-29-102 clearly states that the
definitions listed there apply to the entire Act. Utah Code§ 73-29-102; see State v.

Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356, ,-r 7, 144 P.3d 226 ("[W]hen the Legislature undertakes
to specifically prescribe when a certain definition does and does not apply, the
Legislature's direction is controlling."); State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 n.3 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that it would be" absurd" to look to the dictionary for
the definition of a statutory term "where a specific definition of that very term is
provided in the immediately preceding subsection of an integrated and carefully
drawn statute" and that "[t]his is particularly true where the text introducing the
definitions makes clear that the definitions are to be used throughout the entire
statutory section"). In other words, the definition of "navigable water" for
purposes of this case is a question of state law, not federal law, and the state may
adopt any definition it chooses. See Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park

Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("[F]or purposes of public use
of waters, the state may adopt different and less stringent tests of navigability
than those adopted under federal law.").
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The error should have been obvious to the district court as "the law
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." State v.

Dean, 2004 UT 63, ,-r 16, 95 P.3d 276. The district court clearly understood that
USAC's right to access the bed of the Weber River where it crosses the
landowners' properties flowed from the Act. (R.868.) As a result, it should have
been obvious to the court that the entirety of the Act applied to this case, and that
the definitions contained therein should be used to interpret its substantive
provisions.
Finally, and critically, the error was harmful. The district court applied the
federal navigability for title test, which required the court to evaluate the
navigability of the Weber River as of the time of statehood. (R.868-70.) But the
definition of a "[n]avigable water" in the Act has no such restriction. Utah Code
§ 73-29-102(4). Rather, the Act states that a "'[n]avigable water' means a water
course that in its natural state without the aid of artificial means is useful for
commerce and has a useful capacity as a public highway of transportation." Id.
The evidence presented at trial focused entirely on late nineteenth-century trade
on the upper Weber River, not present-day commerce. (See R.974-77.) And while
the parties presented some evidence of present-day boat travel on the river, that
evidence does not establish that the Weber River where it crosses the
landowners' properties "is useful for commerce and has a useful capacity as a
public highway of transportation" at present. Utah Code§ 73-29-102(4); (see
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R.975). The outcome of this matter would therefore have been more favorable to
Orange Street had the district court applied the correct definition of navigability
to USAC's claim for river access.
In addition, by applying the federal test for title rather than the Act's
definition of navigability, the district court has unsettled the titles of landowners
to this stretch of the Weber River bed, as well as those of unnumbered Utahns
across the state to beds of other waters. The district court's decision also raises
serious questions about the assessment practices of counties and the legitimacy
of property taxes imposed.
Moreover, even if the parties' failure to raise the applicability of the Act's
definition of "navigable water" does not meet the plain error standard, this court
can waive the preservation rule where "controlling authority ... bears upon the
ultimate resolution of a case." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,-r 18, 266 P.3d
828. As in Patterson, where the court considered and applied a controlling statute
despite the parties' failure to raise it, this court should "decline to ignore
controlling law." Id. ,-r 21.
In short, the trial court committed plain error when it failed to apply the
correct test for and legal definition of "navigable water." This court should
reverse on that basis.s But even if Orange Street cannot demonstrate plain error,

s Alternatively, this court may remand for the district court to consider the
application of the Act's definition of navigability to the facts.
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this court should still reverse, as the district court erroneously interpreted and
applied the federal test of navigability for title.
3.

The district court erroneously interpreted the federal test for
navigability for title as being satisfied by evidence of log drives alone
and by evidence that the river was used only during short periods of
seasonal high water

Under federal law, whether a particular waterway is navigable is a
question that arises under a variety of circumstances. The United States Supreme
Court articulated the basic formulation of the test for navigability in The Daniel
Ball, a late nineteenth-century case concerning the scope of the federal

government's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause: "Those rivers must
be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in
their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870).
This test, however, "is not applied in the same way" in all cases. PPL
Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012). The Court has articulated

various modifications to accommodate the needs of various types of cases. In
cases involving questions of state title under the equal footing doctrine,
navigability determinations must be made as of the time of statehood: "In
accordance with the constitutional principle of the equality of states, the title to
the beds of rivers within Utah passed to that state when it was admitted to the
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Union, if the rivers were then navigable; and, if they were not then navigable, the
title to the river beds remained in the United States." United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64, 75 (1931). And, in contrast to cases involving admiralty jurisdiction or the
federal commerce power, navigability for title cases require evaluation of the
river in its "natural and ordinary condition," without improvements affecting
navigability. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228-29.
While the district court acknowledged the Daniel Ball test for navigability
and the restrictions noted above, it failed to correctly interpret and apply that test
in two respects. First, the district court failed to acknowledge that a navigable
river must have been used for both trade and travel at statehood, and could not
base a finding of navigability on log drive evidence alone. Second, it failed to
acknowledge that a river's utility for trade and travel cannot be limited to times
of temporary high water. Because the log drives occurred only during such
times, they could not support a finding of navigability. These errors warrant
reversal.
3.1

To be considered navigable, a river must have been used or
susceptible of being used for both trade and travel at the time of
statehood, and log drives alone are insufficient evidence of
navigability

The navigability test has consistently been expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in the conjunctive. That is, its plain language requires that, at
statehood, navigable rivers were used or susceptible of being used "as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
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customary modes of trade and travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563
(emphases added). And because the test is expressed in the conjunctive, the
terms trade and travel necessarily refer to different actions or requirements vis-avis navigability. See Gay Hill Field Serv. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 750 P.2d
606, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that when a test is conjunctive, all parts
of the test must be satisfied).
In every one of its navigability for title cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has
examined evidence of both trade and travel in making its navigability
determination, with trade evidenced by "useful commerce," and travel by the
transportation of people or things by boat. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49,56 (1926). For example, in United States v. Utah, the Court considered
whether certain sections of the Green, Colorado, and SanJuan rivers were
navigable. 283 U.S. at 71. There, the Court noted evidence of "the actual
navigation of the rivers with full description of the size and character of boats,
and the circumstances of use." Id. at 82. It noted the "expedition of Major John W.
Powell down the Green and the Colorado rivers," and, years later, "a large
number of enterprises, with boats of various sorts, including rowboats, flatboats,
steamboats, motorboats, barges and scows, some being used for exploration,
some for pleasure, some to carry passengers and supplies, and others in
connection with prospecting, surveying, and mining operations." Id. at 82. As for
trade, the Court explained that evidence of actual commercial use was not the
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test, but the rivers' "susceptibility to use as highways of commerce." Id. Because
the "physical characteristics" of and "uses to which the streams have been put"
evidenced the rivers' "capacity" for useful commerce, the Court found certain
sections of the rivers to be navigable. Id. at 83, 89.
Likewise, in Utah v. United States, the Court determined the Great Salt Lake
to be navigable based on its evaluations of both trade and boat travel. 403 U.S. 9,
10 (1971). The Court noted late nineteenth-century evidence of "nine boats used
from time to time to haul cattle and sheep from the mainland to one of the
islands or from one of the islands to the mainland" and "one boat used by an
outsider who carried sheep to an island for the owners of the sheep." Id. at 11.
The Court also noted evidence of boats used to haul "ore, and salt, and cedar
posts" to and from an island in the lake, as well as a boat that "was used to carry
salt from various salt works around the lake to a railroad connection." Id. at 12.
The evidence was "not extensive," but was sufficient to support the conclusion
that "[t]he lake was used as a highway." Id. at 11.
In United States v. Holt State Bank, the Court relied on evidence of trade and
boat travel in finding a Minnesota lake navigable. 270 U.S. 49, 57 (1926). It noted
that "[e]arly visitors and settlers ... used the river [which traversed the lake] and
lake as a route of travel, employing the small boats of the period for the
purpose." Id. at 56-57. And as for trade, "[m]erchants in the settlements ... which
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were several miles up [the] river from the lake, used the river and lake in sending
for and bringing in their supplies." Id. at 57.
In the Court's most recent case involving navigability for title, PPL
Montana, it viewed obstacles to boat travel as an important indicator of

nonnavigability. 132 S. Ct. at 1231. The Court noted that Lewis and Clark had
traveled on or alongside the Missouri River during their expedition of the
American West. Id. at 1223. Certain segments of the river, because of their
waterfalls, steep cliffs and swift water," were not passable by boat, and Lewis
II

and Clark i'/circumvent[ed] the Great Falls and their surrounding reach of river"
by proceeding over a more circuitous land route by means of portage." Id. The
II

Court explained that these portages defeat a finding of navigability ... because
II

they require transportation over land rather than over the water."6 Id. at 1231
(quotations omitted).
Lack of both trade and travelled the Court in Oklahoma v. Texas to
conclude that the Red River was nonnavigable. 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922). The
Court explained that in the decades prior to Oklahoma's statehood, "boats of
light draft carried merchandise up the river ... and took out cotton and other
11

products on the return trip." Id. at 589. But [t]his occurred only in period of high
11

water, and was accomplished under difficulties." Id. And [w]hen the railroads

6 Although boats were unable to safely traverse this stretch of river, it certainly
would not have been an obstacle to logs.
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were constructed this high-water or flood navigation ceased." Id. at 589-90. This
evidence, the Court explained, "establishes that trade and travel neither do nor
can move over that part of the river, in its natural and ordinary condition." Id. at
591.
Likewise, in United States v. Oregon, the Court found five bodies of water in
Oregon to be nonnavigable based on the nonexistence of trade and travel. 295
U.S. 1, 23 (1935). The Court explained that "boating which took place in the area
involved had no commercial aspects and was of such a character as to be no
indication of navigability." Id. at 21. Moreover, "[n]umerous witnesses who had
lived in the vicinity for many years had never used a boat and had never, or
rarely, seen one on the lake." Id. And though there was evidence that a few
trappers and duck hunters used boats, "[a]ll wore gummed boots and found it
necessary, in the use of the boats, to get out and pull them over shallow points in
the lake." Id. In other words, "many difficulties were customarily encountered in
the use of boats." Id. at 21-22. The evidence, therefore, was of" occasional use of
boats, sporadic and ineffective," which, given the "flat topography" of the area,
"shallow water," and other physical characteristics, "preclude[ d) the use for
navigation of the area in question." Id. at 23.
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's consistent examination of evidence of
both trade and travel when determining questions of navigability for title, USAC
presented no evidence of statehood-era boat travel. Sara Dant testified that she
'!
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found no evidence of boat travel on the upper Weber River, including the
portion of the river that crosses the landowners' properties, during the late
nineteenth century. (R.975:76.) And while Gary Nichols testified to the types of
boat travel possible on the upper Weber River at present, he did not testify
regarding whether the watercraft used to travel on the Weber River today "are
meaningfully similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at the time of
statehood," as would be required for USAC to successfully "use present-day
evidence for title purposes." (R.975:120-28,131-36); PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1233.7
Rather, USAC supported its claim of navigability solely with evidence of log
drives, and the district court grounded its finding of navigability on that
evidence alone. (R.879-91.) But the U.S. Supreme Court has never suggested,
much less held, that log drives- standing alone- are sufficient to constitute both
trade and travel in support of a navigability for title determination. To the
contrary, the Court has stated that "[t]he mere fact that logs, poles, and rafts are
floated down a stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a
navigable river." U.S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899).
Evidence of log drives is relevant to the trade and commerce inquiry, but a
finding of navigability cannot be based on log drive evidence alone. Lower
courts usually support navigability findings involving log drive evidence with
PPL Montana also requires that a party seeking to use present-day boat use
under the navigability for title test demonstrate that "the river's poststatehood
condition is not materially different from its physical condition at statehood."
132 S. Ct. at 1233.
7
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evidence of boat travel as well. E.g., Hardy v. State Land Bd., 360 P.3d 647, 663 (Or.
Ct. App. 2015) (holding that "the occurrence of log drives on the upper portion of
the river post-statehood, and evidence of present-day boating use of that portion
of the river, support the conclusion that the river's conditions at the time of
statehood would have permitted use of the river as a highway of commercethat is, for timber transport and canoe-based travel and trade"); Nw. Steelheaders
Ass'n, Inc. v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 392-95 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (finding John Day

River at certain locations to be "actually used for travel and trade" or
u

susceptible to navigation" based on evidence of statehood-era Native American

canoe-based trade and post-statehood uNative American canoe-based trade, log
runs, and sternwheeler traffic"); McCormack v. State, No. 09CV1654CC (Douglas
Cnty. Cir. Ct., Or. Dec. 7, 2010) (finding portion of North Umpqua River to be
navigable based on evidence of pre-statehood Native American canoe use, preand post-statehood use of canoes for trade and travel by settlers, post-statehood
log drives, and present-day use of watercraft for recreation) (attached as Add. E);
Oregon v. Tidewater Contractor, Inc., No. 93-6017-HO (D. Or. Aug. 12, 1994),

http:/ jwww.oregon.gov / dsljNAV /Documents/Chetco%20River%20Lawsuit%
201994.pdf (finding portion of Chetco River to be navigable based on evidence of
pre-statehood canoe travel by Native Americans, post-statehood log floats, post-
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statehood transport of "tan bark" by "flat-bottomed boats," other post-statehood
boat use, and modern recreational use and boat travel) (attached as Add. F).s
We can find only two cases in which lower courts rely on log drive
evidence alone to support a finding of navigability for purposes of establishing
title. But the reasoning presented in both cases is suspect, and neither
conclusively establishes that log drives are evidence of both trade and travel.
First, in State of Oregon ex rel. Division of State Lands v. Riverfront Protection
Ass'n, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the appropriate test for navigability for

title. 672 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1982). As a result, it does not unambiguously stand for
the proposition that log drive evidence alone is sufficient to support a
navigability for title finding. In Riverfront, a magistrate judge had determined
that the McKenzie River was not navigable at the time of Oregon's statehood. Id.
at 794. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit cited The Daniel Ball as the source of the rule
for navigability for title determinations, and explained that it had recently "held
evidence of transportation of logs by river sufficient, when joined with the other
facts of the case, to support a finding of navigability for purposes of federal
regulatory jurisdiction under [the Federal Power Act]." Id. at 794-95. Based on
that recent case, the court reversed the magistrate's ruling and held that the river
s State v. Bunkowski also falls into this category. 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972).
Although the Nevada Supreme Court's decision references only log drives that
occurred on the Carson River for a period of thirty-five years in finding the river
to be navigable, the court was presented with evidence of boat travel as well.
Appellant's Brief at 5, 7-8, State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972) (No. 6799)
(attached as Add. G).
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is navigable because log drives were held on the river for seventeen years during
the statehood era. Id. at 795-96.
But the Riverfront court not only misapplied the recent case, that other case
applied an entirely different rule for navigability. In the recent case cited by the
Riverfront court, Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the Ninth Circuit considered evidence that shingle bolts were floated

down the river and that the river ~~supported navigation by light craft, primarily
Indian canoes" -in other words, evidence of both trade and travel. 644 F.2d 785,
788 (9th Cir. 1981). The Riverfront court admitted as much when it described
Puget Sound as holding that ~~transportation of logs by river" was sufficient to

support a finding of navigability u when joined with the other facts of the case." 672
F.2d at 794-95 (emphasis added). The Riverfront court therefore failed to follow
Puget Sound when it did not require evidence of boat travel in addition to the log

drive evidence to support its navigability finding.
Moreover, because Puget Sound was not a navigability for title case, the
court did not apply the navigability for title test. 644 F.2d at 787-88. Rather, it
applied the definition of navigability appropriate to the regulatory question
before it, which is found in the Federal Power Act. Id. at 787. But this definition
bears little resemblance to the navigability for title test. 9 Id. Therefore, even if the

According to the Puget Sound court, the Federal Power Act defined "navigable
waters" as follows:
9
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court had found that log drives alone were sufficient to support a finding of
navigability, that finding would apply only to navigability determinations for
purposes of the Federal Power Act. Puget Sound does not stand for the
proposition that log drive evidence alone can support a navigability finding
under the navigability for title test. Because it erroneously relied on a different
navigability rule, the Riverfront court's analysis and reasoning have no relevance
here.
Second, the only other case supposedly relying only on log floats for a
navigability for title finding, Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, is
likewise suspect as precedent. 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984). There, the Montana
Supreme Court determined the Dearborn River to be navigable at statehood
because the river satisfied the log-floating test for navigability under the federal
II

those parts of streams or other bodies of water over which
Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate with foreign
nations and among the several States, and which either in their
natural or improved condition notwithstanding interruptions
between the navigable parts of such streams or waters by falls,
shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage, are used or suitable for
use for the transportation of persons or property in interstate or
foreign commerce, including therein all such interrupting falls,
shallows, or rapids, together with such other parts of streams as
shall have been authorized by Congress for improvement by the
United States or shall have been recommended to Congress for such
improvement after investigation under its authority."
II • • •

644 F.2d at 787 (quoting 16 U.S. C. § 796(8)). The test for navigability for
Commerce Clause purposes is more broad than the test for navigability for state
title. See Robert W. Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law: The Historical,
yet Declining Role of Navigability, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1643, 1673-74 (2013).
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test of navigability for title." 10 Id. at 166. But the court did not identify, define, or
explain this so-called "log-floating test," and the cases cited by the court do not
identify such a test.1 1 Id. In addition, because Curran involves a claim of
recreation access and the court also bases its holding on navigability under state
11

law, it is not clear that the unidentified federal log-floating test" is applicable at
11

all. Id. at 165, 168, 169-70 ( [T]he test of navigability for use and not for title, is a
test to be determined under state law and not federal law."). As a result, Curran
does not clearly stand for the proposition that log drives alone are sufficient to
establish navigability for title under the federal test.
Here, the district court failed to appreciate that the navigability for title test
requires evidence of both trade and travel. In particular, it erred in relying on log
drive evidence alone to establish that the Weber River was, at the time of
II

statehood, used and susceptible of being used, in its natural and ordinary
condition, as [a] highway of commerce, over which trade and travel were
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over water." (R.891.)
Evidence of boat travel, none of which was presented by USAC, is also required.

1o The log drive evidence consisted of the following:

[T]he Dearborn River was
used in 1887, two years before Montana statehood, to float approximately
100,000 railroad ties. Furthermore, in 1888 and 1889, one or two log drives per
year were floated down the Dearborn. One drive in 1888 contained 700,000 board
feet." Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, 682 P.2d at 166.
n Those cases are The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874); Sierra Pacific Power
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 681 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); and Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792.
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II

The district court cited only three cases- Bunkowski, Curran, and
Riverfront-to support its reliance on log drive evidence. (R.870-71.) But none of

those clearly stands for the proposition that log drives alone may support a
finding that a river is navigable for purposes of establishing title. Nor do those
cases appropriately rely on any U.S. Supreme Court precedents for that
proposition. The district court here also suggested that because the U.S. Supreme
Court's "most recent case ... addressing navigability for title," PPL Montana,
"did not discuss the issue of log drives," it does not "rule out the potential for
finding navigability based upon log drive evidence." (R.871.) This is true, but
because PPL Montana involved evidence of boat travel, too, the proper inference
to be drawn from that decision is that log drive evidence, in combination with
evidence of boat travel, may establish the trade and travel required for a finding
of navigability.12 132 S. Ct. at 1233-34. With due respect, to rely on PPL Montana
as support for the contrary proposition stretches the precedent beyond
recognition. Log drives are relevant to the issue of navigability; they just cannot
stand as the sole evidence of it. The district court therefore lacked any persuasive
legal authority for its determination that "the Weber River is navigable in law
PPL Montana involved evidence of present-day boat use. 132 S. Ct. at 1233-34.
The Court ruled that the Montana Supreme Court erred in considering "presentday use of the Madison [to be] probative of its susceptibility of use at statehood"
without further inquiry as to whether "(1) the watercraft are meaningfully
similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at the time of statehood;
and (2) the river's poststatehood condition is not materially different from its
physical condition." Id. at 1233-34. The Court remanded for the Montana
Supreme Court to consider these "necessary" issues. Id. at 1234-35.
12
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where it passes by and through the Landowner Properties" and that, as a result,
"the State of Utah holds sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber below the
ordinary high water mark at the location of the Landowner Properties." (R.892.)
This court should reverse.
3.2

A river is not navigable if its utility for trade and travel is limited
to times of temporary high water

The district court also erred in failing to acknowledge that the Weber River
is useful for log drives only during temporary times of high water, and, as a
result cannot be considered navigable for purposes of the federal test for title.
While a river need not be navigable year-round to meet the test, the U.S.
Supreme Court has explained that a river is not navigable if it is useful for trade
and travel "only in times of temporary high water." Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at
698-99. In other words, "[w]hile ... a river need not be susceptible of navigation
at every point during the year, neither can that susceptibility be so brief that it is
not a commercial reality." PPL Mont. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1234.
For example, in Oklahoma v. Texas, the Court evaluated evidence that boats
could be operated on the Red River only during "intermittent" periods of high
water "of irregular and short duration." 258 U.S. 574, 589 (1922). These periods
occurred "when the rainfall is running off" and lasted "from 1 to 7 days and in
the aggregate seldom cover[ed] as much as 40 days a year." Id. at 587. The Court
explained that because the river's use for transportation "has been and must be
exceptional, and confined to the irregular and short periods of temporary high

51

water," it is not navigable. Id. at 591. A greater capacity for practical and
II

beneficial use in commerce is essential to establish navigability." Id.
This greater capacity" was evident in United States v. Utah. 283 U.S. 64
II

(1931). There, the Court observed that the Green, Grand, and Colorado Rivers'
II

susceptibility of use as a highway for commerce was not confined to exceptional

conditions or short periods of temporary high water, but that during at least nine
months of each year the river[s] ordinarily [were] susceptible of such use as a
highway for commerce." Id. at 87 (quotations omitted). The Court found the
rivers to be navigable. Id. at 89.
Oklahoma and Utah represent opposite ends of the navigability spectrum, at

least with respect to the prohibition on use confined to times of temporary high
water. Few of the log drive cases supply enough detail to be placed on this
spectrum, but those that do support that rivers are nonnavigable if their utility is
limited to times of temporary high water.
In Oregon ex rel. Division of State Lands v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, the
Ninth Circuit enforced the "temporary high water" restriction and explained that
log drives on the McKenzie River, which it found to be navigable, did not occur
during times of high water or low water, but when the level of the river was
somewhere in between during a three-month period of the year. 672 F.2d 792,
795 (9th Cir. 1982). Riverfront, to the extent its reasoning and analysis is reliable,B
See supra section 3.1, explaining that Riverfront applied the wrong test for
navigability.

13
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therefore suggests that log drives that rely on high water cannot be used to
establish navigability.
The Eighth Circuit agrees. In North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and
School Lands v. United States, the court examined evidence of a single tie drive on

the Little Missouri River that occurred "only ... with the benefit of high waters."
972 F.2d 235,238 (8th Cir. 1992). Because the drive "was an isolated venture that
was only partially successful because of unusually high water," and in
combination with limited evidence of boat travel on the river, the court found the
river to be nonnavigable. Id. at 239-40.
The district court did not consider that navigability cannot be based on
evidence of trade and travel that occurs during "times of temporary high water."
Rather, the court analyzed the evidence of the short time the Weber's water was
high enough for log drives as a question of whether a waterway could be
navigable if its utility for trade and travel was seasonal. The court explained that
seasonality did not prevent navigability:
The fact that, during certain seasons of a year, a waterway may not
be useful for commerce or trade should not bar a finding of
navigability. Some navigable waterways may not be passable due to
ice or freezing during winter seasons. Others may not be useful for
commerce during high runoff periods, while others may not be
useful for commerce during low runoff periods. This Court
concludes that evidence of seasonality of commerce on a waterway
should not bar a finding of navigability, provided that the waterway
was regularly used for commerce on a seasonal basis, and was not
dependent on unusual conditions for use in commerce.
(R.871.)
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But the U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted a rule that rivers that are
"regularly used for commerce on a seasonal basis" are navigable. Rather, it has
made clear that navigable rivers' utility may not be limited to "times of
temporary high water." Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 698-99. The district court
therefore erred not only by failing to recognize and evaluate that limitation, but
by fashioning a rule focused on "regular" and "seasonal" use.
Moreover, an application of the court's own findings to the rule
prohibiting navigability based on use during "times of temporary high water"
would result in a finding of nonnavigability. In its findings of fact, the court
stated that "[lUke marty mountain rivers in the West, the bulk of the Weber's
flow comes in the spring runoff season, typically during the months of May and
June." (R.876.) The court found that spring flows are capable of floating logs and
that "general conditions and characteristics on the Upper Weber during the
statehood era or in 1896 were not materially different than present-day
conditions and characteristics." (R.877-78.) And the court heard testimony that
the log drives on the Weber River occurred during the spring runoff (R.974:10709,138,170,208,229;977:35-36.) Because those spring runoff flows are "times of
temporary high water," evidence of trade and travel that occur during those
times cannot establish navigability regardless of whether the runoff is "regular."
This court should reverse.
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Conclusion

The district court erred in concluding that the State holds title to the bed of
the Weber River where it crosses Orange Street's property because USAC lacks
standing to challenge title. The district court also plainly erred in failing to apply
the applicable statutory test for navigability. And even if the district court did
apply the correct test for navigability, it misinterpreted and misapplied that test.
This court should reverse.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2016.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER
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